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Introduction
Government ideology is likely to influence education policy. Conventional wisdom has been that leftwing governments spend more on education than rightwing governments. The partisan theories predict that political parties gratify the needs of their constituencies. Leftwing parties have received a great deal of electoral support by the working class and low-income voters.
Because the working class and low-income voters may not afford to finance private education or to pay tuition fees, leftwing governments are expected to publicly finance education.
Electoral cohesion has however declined and party positions have moved. Leftwing governments do no longer represent the working class but rather the middle class. It is conceivable that politicians gratify their constituencies by spending money on higher and lower education. We elaborate on theoretical predictions and empirical findings in Section 2.
The introduction of tuition fees in Germany in 2006 is an especially worthwhile objective to investigate ideology-induced education policies because of two reasons. 3 First, tuition fees were not allowed in Germany for a long time. In January 2005, the German Supreme Court permitted the state governments to introduce tuition fees. Second, government ideology did not play an important role in economic policy-making at the federal level (e.g.
De Haan and Zelhorst 1993 , Berger and Woitek 1997 , Potrafke 2012 . Policies of the rightwing Christian Democrats and the leftwing Social Democrats have converged. Germany is however a federal state with 16 individual states (Laender). It is conceivable that government ideology influences economic policy-making at the state level. The German Laender governments have hardly any means to raise taxes and are also restrained in many policy fields. The Laender governments are however responsible for education policies. An intriguing question therefore is whether ideological differences are transpired by education policies in the German Laender. Previous research has indeed shown that government ideology influences public spending for universities and schooling (Oberndorfer and Steiner 2007 , Wolf 2007 , Potrafke 2011a . 4 Introducing tuition fees has been controversial across the German states. By exploiting the natural experiment, we examine how government ideology influenced the introduction of tuition fees. 
Government ideology and education policy
Leftwing governments are expected to spend more on education than rightwing governments.
The significant difference between leftwing and rightwing governments in the education system is that leftwing governments favor the expansion of public authority in the education system, whereas rightwing governments favor private alternatives (Busemeyer 2009 ). In Switzerland, for example, social democratic ideology has had a negative influence on privatizing education (Merzyn and Ursprung 2005) . Scholars have investigated the influence of government ideology on total education spending and often find that overall education spending was higher under leftwing governments in OECD countries (Boix 1997 , Schmidt 2007 , Busemeyer 2007 , Ansell 2008 , Potrafke 2011b . By contrast, the results by Jensen (2011) do not suggest that overall education spending was higher under leftwing governments in the period 1980-2000 in OECD countries. Jensen's (2011) argument confronts with the "Boix model" predicting that total education spending is higher under social democratic governments: leftwing governments will not increase total education expenditure but rather decrease it because redistribution -the leftist ultimate goal -can be optimized by other policy areas such as social policy. 4 Rightwing governments in the German states have also been shown to increase police employment (Tepe and Vanhuysse 2013) . 5 See Kemnitz (2007 Kemnitz ( , 2010 on how tuition fees influence the quality of higher education and Schindler (2011) on how tuition fees influence the labor tax schedule. Poutvaara and Kanniainen (2000) study a social contract on financing higher education between high-ability and low-ability agents, implemented using tax schedules. Poutvaara (2011) studies how subsidies to higher education and income tax schedule interact in the political process.
Politicians spend money on lower and higher education. An extension of the Boix model predicts that leftwing governments increase spending on primary and secondary education and decrease spending on tertiary education. The traditional clientele of leftwing parties such as workers profit more from spending on primary and secondary education than on tertiary education.
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In the German Laender, for example, leftwing governments have somewhat increased spending for schooling, whereas rightwing governments have increased spending for universities (Oberndorfer and Steiner 2007, Potrafke 2011a). 7 Also total education expenditures have been shown to be lower under leftwing governments (Wolf 2007 ).
The share of students with a parental background traditionally associated with the clientele of the Social Democrats is still rather small. Consequently, the clientele of the Social Democrats will benefit more from public expenditures on lower education such as schooling.
The model by Ansell (2008) also shows that rightwing parties are often proponents of increased spending on universities. In Scotland, however, the Labour party supported tuition fees, while the other parties preferred to abolish tuition fees (Hassan and Warhurst 2001) . In the British House of Commons, rightwing members of the Labour party were less likely to vote against the Labour's own proposal to introduce tuition fees than other Labour politicians (Benedetto and Hix 2007) . In Hungary, both members of parliament and voters of the leftwing MSZP party have been more in favor of tuition fees than members of parliament and voters of the rightwing Fidesz-MPP party (Todosijevic 2005) . 6 Consumption values of higher education may also differ across individuals (Alstadsaeter 2011) . 7 Schulze's (2008) results suggest that conservative politicians tend to spend more on research in relative terms. The results by Tepe and Vanhuysse (2009) show that incumbents accelerated hiring of new teachers before elections in the German Laender. In a similar vein, public employment increased before elections in Finland and Sweden (Dahlberg and Mörk 2011) . 8 To be sure, the model by Ansell (2008) views partisan choices on higher education "in a trilemma between the level of enrollment, the degree of subsidization, and the overall public cost of higher education" (p. 190). On ideology-induced education policy see also Iversen and Stephens (2008) . 9 Fisher et al. (2009) discuss the political economy of post-secondary education in three Canadian provinces.
In the course of declining electoral cohesion, however, leftwing parties may want to cater for middle-class voter groups without alienating their core constituencies. Busemeyer (2009) therefore calls the extended Boix model into question and predicts higher spending for tertiary education under leftwing governments: "the reason why social democrats prefer public higher education institutions is that in this case the decision on the expansion of access to higher education is not delegated to private institutions, but remains within the reach of public authority" (Busemeyer 2009: 111f.) . 
Empirical analysis

The German political party landscape
Two major political parties have characterized the political spectrum in Germany: the leftist Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU). In Bavaria, Germany's largest federal state by area, the conservatives are not represented by the CDU but by their sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU). No party competition emerges between the CDU and the CSU and they form one fraction in the federal parliament (Bundestag). This is why we label both CDU in the empirical analysis. All federal chancellors and state prime ministers -except the green prime minister of Baden-Wuerttemberg elected in 2011 -were members of one of these two major blocs, SPD and CDU. We can therefore test Table 1 shows that most Laender introduced tuition fees of 500 Euro per term. Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia allowed their universities to charge less than 500 Euro. The government in Hamburg lowered the fee from 500 Euro to 375 Euro in 2008. In the Saarland the fee increased from 300 Euro to 500 Euro in the third term of study. Several states introduced exceptions e.g. for students with a specific family background or for high-potential students. Federal state banks and the public KfW bank offer student loans under non-market conditions. Student loans from private banks are also available. 
Universities
Universities of
Applied Sciences
Baden-Wuerttemberg 500 500
Bavaria 300-500 100-500
Hamburg 500/375* 500/375* Hesse 500 500
Lower Saxony 500 500
North Rhine-Westphalia up to 500 up to 500
Saarland 300/500** 300/500**
In the case of Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia the Universities can/could decide upon the tuition fees within the given interval * Reduction to 375 Euro passed on 09/17/08 and took effect as of the winter term 08/09. ** Increase to 500 Euro in the third term of study. Table 2 shows which state governments introduced tuition fees. 14 On the "shadows of socialist past" and preference differences between East Germans and West Germans see also Bauernschuster et al. (2012 We include the vote shares as an explanatory variable to disentangle the effect of government ideology and voter preferences on tuition fee policies (see, e.g. Elinder and Jordahl 2013 , Freier and Odendahl 2012 and Liang 2013 . η i describes a fixed state effect, ε t is a fixed time effect and u i,t describes an error term.
Anecdotal evidence
We test the differences between leftwing and rightwing governments on the left-right scale using the variable "Left". The variable "Left" takes on the value of one in periods when the SPD was in office without a coalition partner, or formed a coalition with another leftwing party (Greens, Left Party, SSW
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, or a combination) or the FDP. The variable Left takes on the value 0.5 for coalitions of the CDU with a leftwing party (grand coalitions with the SPD, coalitions with the Greens, or coalitions with both the Greens and the FDP). The variable Left is zero for CDU governments without a coalition partner, and for coalitions with the FDP. 16 In the states of Bavaria, North Rhine-Westphalia, and the Saarland tuition fees may differ among terms or universities. We assume the commonly charged tuition fee of 500 Euro for these states. 17 We consider the government ideology at the beginning of the respective term. 18 The SSW (Südschleswigscher Wählerverband) is the party of the Danish minority in Schleswig-Holstein.
With respect to the grand coalitions, we do not distinguish which of the two parties appointed As robustness checks we also estimate the model based on legislative periods and cabinets rather than based on university terms. We consider the influence of ideology on the level of tuition fees (in Euro) at the end of the respective legislative period or cabinet.
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While the beginning of a legislative period is defined by the day of the state election, the beginning of a cabinet is defined by the day of the election of the state prime minister by the parliament.
Our dataset includes ten more cabinets than legislative periods because some legislative 19 Regarding legislative periods or cabinets that have not ended by the end of 2012, we consider the current level of tuition fees. The results are not sensitive to excluding the current legislative periods or cabinets. As first legislative periods or cabinets we consider those legislative periods or cabinets that ended after 1 April 2005, which is the first day of a possible introduction of tuition fees. The results are not sensitive to including the legislative period/cabinet of Schleswig-Holstein that ended before 1 April 2005 but after the Supreme Court decision in January 2005. Decisions about tuition fees took always effect during the same legislative periods or cabinets in which the decisions were made. Only the introduction of tuition fees in Baden-Wuerttemberg took effect in the legislative period/cabinet after the legislative period/cabinet in which the decision was made, but the government ideology was the same in both legislative periods/cabinets. periods include two cabinets (due to the election of a new prime minister within a legislative period). Tables 4, 5 and 6 show descriptive statistics. Table 7 shows that leftwing governments reduce tuition fees. Column (1) includes government ideology in term t-1 and does not include fixed time effects. The estimate indicates that a pure leftwing government reduces tuition fees by about 146 Euro as compared to a pure rightwing government. The coefficient turns out to be statistically significant at the 5% level. Column (2) includes government ideology in term t-2. The estimate indicates that a pure leftwing government reduces tuition fees by about 180 Euro as compared to a pure rightwing government. The third column shows a reduction of 128 Euro when a leftwing government was in office in term t-3. The effects are again statistically significant at the 5% level. We include fixed time effects in columns (4) to (6) and obtain similar results as in the first three columns. A leftwing government reduces tuition fees by 146 Euro, 161 Euro, or 91
Regression Results
Euro (statistically significant effects at the 5% or 1% level). Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table 8 renders the government ideology variable to be statistically significant at larger levels as compared to when the share of rightwing voters is included (Table 8) are not sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of any individual state in more than 98% of the robustness regressions. In the specifications including the vote share variable, however, the inclusion or exclusion of individual states renders the leftwing government variable to lack statistical significance in many cases. Table 9 shows the regression results on the basis of legislative periods rather than on the basis of university terms. The results confirm that leftwing governments reduce tuition fees. Column (1) shows that in a legislative period a pure leftwing government reduces tuition fees by about 262 Euro as compared to a pure rightwing government. The effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. We obtain a similar result of 255 Euro when we include fixed time effects in column (2). The effect is again statistically significant at the 1% level. The effects are somewhat smaller when we include the share of rightwing voters variable. The share of rightwing voters variable is statistically significant at the 5% level when no fixed time effects are included (column 3). The share of rightwing voters variable does not turn out to be statistically significant when fixed time effects are included (column 4). Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table 10 shows the regression results on the basis of cabinet periods. Column (1) shows that when we consider cabinets as time unit, a pure leftwing government reduces tuition fees by about 243 Euro as compared to a pure rightwing government. The effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. We obtain a similar result of 233 Euro when we include fixed time effects in column (2). The effect is statistically significant at the 5% level.
The numerical meaning of the government ideology variable in column (3) is that a pure leftwing government reduces tuition fees by about 160 Euro as compared to a pure rightwing government. In column (4) the government ideology variable fails statistical significance at conventional levels. Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Government ideology also influences the introduction or abolition of tuition fees. We have estimated a panel probit model and find significant effects.
Conclusion
The introduction of tuition fees in the German states has been a prime example for ideologyinduced education policies: rightwing governments were active in introducing tuition fees; leftwing governments strictly denied tuition fees. The result is revealing because ideology retired to the background in German policy-making over the last decades. Given that the room to maneuver of German state governments is limited, the ideology-induced introduction of tuition fees invigorates partisan politics and political polarization. Why is it that leftwing and rightwing governments have implemented different policies? We examine party platforms of the SPD, CDU, FDP, the Greens and the Left Party in the German states. The appendix includes the sources of party platforms. The wordings on which we based our assessments are available upon request. Table 11 shows that the SPD, the Greens, and the Left Party deny tuition fees in all 16
Laender and indeed claim tuition fees to be socially unjust. By contrast, the political right believes that tuition fees are incentive compatible. Electoral motives seem to overshadow ideological purposes in education policy making (Downs 1957 ).
